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vABSTRACT
The post-Soviet state of Moldova has struggled with the challenge of economic 
and political development since its declaration of independence in 1991. Following a 
wider trend in eastern Europe, the Communist party, once discredited and even outlawed 
for three years, has seen its popularity soar from a 10% voter support in 1996 to 50% in 
the 2001 elections and has now returned to power. Peculiarities in the electoral law 
translated this 50% support at the polls into a 70% share of the seats in parliament, an 
overwhelming majority that allows them to govern without compromising and to change 
the Constitution at will. In any new democracy, this kind of concentration of power is a 
worrisome development; in Moldova, it is particularly worrisome because of the well-
known authoritarian tendencies of hardliners within the Communist Party. This thesis 
seeks to determine the reasons that the Communist Party returned to power in Moldova 
and to examine the implications of this return to power on Moldova’s democratic 
transition and democratic future and on U.S. and international efforts to assist its 
democratic transition.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The post-Soviet state of Moldova has struggled with the challenges of economic 
and political development since its declaration of independence in 1991. Following a 
wider trend in eastern Europe, the Communist party, once discredited and even outlawed 
for three years, has seen its popularity soar from a 10% voter support in 1996 to 50% in 
the 2001 elections and has now returned to power. Peculiarities in the electoral law 
translated this 50% support at the polls into a 70% share of the seats in parliament, an 
overwhelming majority that allows them to govern without compromising and to change 
the Constitution at will. In any new democracy, this kind of concentration of power is a 
worrisome development; in Moldova, it is particularly worrisome because of the well-
known authoritarian tendencies of hardliners within the communist party. This thesis 
seeks to determine the reasons that the Communist Party returned to power in Moldova 
and to examine the implications of this return to power on Moldova’s democratic 
transition and its democratic future and on U.S. and international efforts to assist its 
democratic transition.   
It in the decade since Moldova declared independence and began its democratic 
journey, the Republic of Moldova appears to have followed the evolution of most new 
democracies.  The state has succeeded in setting up many of the necessary institutions 
that experts suggest all democracies must have. However, in February 2001, Moldovans 
elected a communist government. Why?  Analysis indicates a combination of causes.  
Four themes resonate throughout the documents written about the Communist Party 
victory in February 2001. These themes are: the severe economic situation and its impact 
on the voters, Communist campaign appeals, citizen disillusionment with democratic 
reforms, and the impact of the electoral rules. 
Moldova, like the other post-Soviet democracies had many challenges, both 
political and economic, to address while making its democratic transition. Not only did 
its entire political system change from a party-run state to an electoral democracy, but 
also it had simultaneously to change its economic system from a command economy to a 
xvi
free market economy.  The transition from a command economy to a free market 
economy was particularly difficult for older Moldovans. Prices sharply rose for food and 
other consumer goods, while workers salaries went unpaid, the value of pensions 
dwindled and the Moldovan leu plunged. Young educated Moldovans fled to neighboring 
countries seeking work and much higher salaries than they could hope for in Moldova. 
Citizens became increasingly dissatisfied with economic conditions and blamed the 
worsening situation on the political ineptness of previous governments, which for some 
citizens, especially the pensioners, caused a nostalgia that linked economic security with 
Soviet times.  For others, it created a desire for change even if it meant the return to 
power of a once hated political party – the Communist Party. 
Now that the Communist Party is in power in Moldova, the question that arises is 
exactly what kind of government is it? Is it communist in name only, capitalizing on 
voter desire for previous stability? Or will it attempt to reverse what democratic progress 
has been made and return to a much more authoritarian mode of governance? At the time 
of this writing, this government has been in power less than a year so it is impossible to 
gage what the long-term effects will be. However, conjectures can be made from 
examining the party platform and rhetoric before the elections and comparing that to the 
declarations and actions of the government since taking control. It appears that this 
government is often split on where it should stand. Analysis of the recent actions of the 
Communist government in Moldova indicate that on the domestic level, where outside 
interference from international organizations is unlikely, the government will act as 
expected – as a hard-line authoritarian type government.  In cases where international 
pressure, such as that from the IMF, is likely, recent government actions indicate that it 
will act as most governments in need of financial aid act – it will adjust its policy out of 
sheer necessity. 
1I. INTRODUCTION  
In the decade since declaring independence from the former U.S.S.R. and 
beginning its democratic reforms, the Republic of Moldova appears to have followed the 
evolution of most new democracies.  The state has succeeded in setting up many of the 
necessary institutions that experts suggest all democracies must have.  Some of these are 
an electoral system that provides for free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, an 
independent central bank, the rule of law, and a civilian led Ministry of Defense. Despite 
these seeming successes, Moldova continues to struggle with very severe challenges of 
retarded economic and political development. The Communist party, once discredited 
and even outlawed for three years, has seen its popularity soar from a 10% voter support 
in 1996 to 50% in the 2000 elections, which brought it to power. Peculiarities in the 
electoral law translated this 50% support at the polls into a 70% share of the seats in 
parliament. This overwhelming majority allows the Communist party to govern without 
compromise with other parties and to change the constitution at will. In any new 
democracy, this kind of concentration of power is a worrisome development; in Moldova, 
it is particularly worrisome because of the well-known authoritarian tendencies of 
hardliners within the communist party.  
Several questions of analysis and policy arise from these events. The most 
obvious is why did the Moldovans elect a communist government. Next, the Communist 
party won a constitutional majority in the parliament. What will be the impact of this new 
government on Moldova’s democratic transition? Is Moldova going backwards toward an 
authoritarian form of government or are these just some of the growing pains that all 
post-Soviet democracies must face? Is this new government a “hard-line communist” 
government or is it more of a “social democratic” government? What impact will this 
government have on Moldova’s relationship with international organizations? With 
accession to the World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) in May 2001 and aspirations to join 
the European Union sometime in the near future, Moldova is struggling to become more 
Western in its economic policies and practices. At the same time, its continuing ties with 
Russia, both economic and political, tend to confound its pursuit of that goal. What are 
2the implications for Moldova as it tries both to please Moscow and to satisfy the 
requirements of international financial organizations and the European Union?     
Moldova is currently participating in the U.S. Department of Defense sponsored 
State Partnership Program and partnered with the state of North Carolina and the North 
Carolina National Guard. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) links US 
states with partner countries’ defense ministries, other government agencies, and 
businesses for the purpose of improving bilateral relations with the US and to promote 
regional stability.  The program’s goals include assisting partner countries’ civil-military 
relations development in support of US policy objectives and they reflect a growing 
international affairs mission for the National Guard.  
Initially, the primary vehicles for the program were the States’ National Guards.  
The National Guard was chosen instead of regular armed forces in order avoid sending a 
provocative signal to the Russian Federation.  Its core engagement competencies, 
particularly military support to civil authority, are emphasized (“Information”). It has 
since grown far beyond a military-to-military contact program, expanding to include 
State governmental agencies, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
businesses.  The Republic of Moldova and the State of North Carolina formalized their 
partnership on April 22, 1999.  The North Carolina - Moldova Partnership for Peace 
Memorandum of Intent indicates an agreement to link these two states together to 
encourage and better facilitate cooperation in the areas of civil emergency operations, 
market expansion, cultural, scientific and academic exchanges, and to coordinate 
humanitarian efforts of many governmental and non-governmental organizations 
(“Memorandum”).  The SPP is a valuable engagement tool, allowing interaction in social 
and economic—as well as military—spheres, and actively supports the National Military 
Strategy’s mandate to shape the international security environment (“Information”). 
Today, a total of 29 countries around the world are partnered with 30 US states and one 
territory.
3A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Why did Moldovans elect a Communist government in 2001? To respond to this 
question, an analysis must include a combination of likely causes.  The leading cause 
appears to be Moldova’s severe economic situation. Some other factors – widespread 
disillusionment with democratic reforms and the Communist Party campaign appeals 
promising to address economic problems – seem to stem from this primary problem.  
Moldova, like the other post-Soviet democracies had many challenges, both 
political and economic, to address while making its democratic transition. Not only did 
its entire political system change from a Party-run state to an electoral democracy, but 
also it had to change its economic system from a command economy to a free market 
economy simultaneously.  The transition from a command economy to a free market 
economy was particularly difficult for most Moldovans, especially for older Moldovans 
who rely on fixed pensions. Without the government price controls, prices rose sharply 
for food and other consumer goods.  Salaries went unpaid, sometimes for months at a 
time. At the same time, the value of the Moldovan currency, the leu, plunged causing the 
value of pensions to dwindle. It was estimated that in 2001, 90% of Moldovans lived on 
less than 1 USD per day and 80% of the population live on less than $20 (233 lei) a 
month, which according to the Moldovan Department of Statistical and Sociological 
Analysis, is below the subsistence level (Barbarosie, “Understanding”).
The worsening economic conditions also caused young and educated Moldovans 
(mostly under age 40) to flee in droves to neighboring countries to seek work and much 
higher salaries than they could hope for in Moldova. Leonid Ryabkov in his newspaper 
article “Where Do National’s Immigrate” reported that between 1990 and 2000, 100,644 
Moldovans, out of a population of 4.5 million, were granted permission to leave the 
country permanently and indicated that many are never expected to return (Ryabkov).1
The tone of the article indicated that the Moldovan government considered these numbers 
to be very high and extremely detrimental to the country both in economic and societal 
realms.  They considered this detrimental not only because of the numbers, but because 
this exodus is draining the country of its vibrant, educated, and much-needed workforce.   
1 Data enumerating the number of rejected applications or those leaving unofficially was not available. 
4Like other post-Soviet democracies, the economic reforms designed to assist the 
country in its democratic transition have taken longer to produce positive effects than 
citizens expected.  In some cases, the reforms seem to have made life even harder for the 
average citizen.  Many Moldovans expected to make personal sacrifices in the name of 
democratic and economic reform for one to two years at most (Botan).  The failure of 
economic reforms to make life better for average Moldovans in a scant one to two year 
period began to erode public confidence in these reforms.  As Moldova’s economic 
problems seemed to go from bad to worse over the next decade, citizens became 
increasingly frustrated with its poor economic performance and they had little confidence 
in the previous government’s ability to address the country’s problems.  They blamed the 
worsening economic situation on the political ineptness of previous governments, which 
for some citizens, especially the pensioners, caused a nostalgia that linked economic 
security with Soviet times.  For others, it created a desire for change even if it meant the 
return to power of a once hated political party – the Communist Party. 
Immensely unpopular and even unlawful for three years after Moldova’s 
independence in 1991, the Communist party in Moldova rapidly gained voter support and 
popularity between the 1996 and the 2001 elections.  The increase in voter support from 
only 10% of the votes in 1996 to over 50% in 2001 demonstrates the Communist Party’s 
meteoric rise to power. This power was magnified because electoral laws translated 50% 
voter support at the polls into a 70% share of the seats in parliament.  All parties were 
required to attain a minimum threshold of 6% of the total vote to gain seats for their party 
in the government. The individual candidate threshold was 3%.  Votes for parties or 
individual candidates who did not make the threshold were redistributed proportionally to 
parties that did meet the threshold.  This provided the Communist Party with a 71% 
majority allowing it almost unlimited power.  Of the 17 parties and 10 individual (non-
party) candidates that competed for 101 seats in the 2001 Parliamentary Elections, only 2 
parties besides the Communist Party received enough votes to obtain seats in the 
Parliament.  The Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) received 8.24% of votes 
and claimed 11 seats.  The Electoral Bloc “Braghis Alliance” (EBBA) captured 13.36% 
of votes and claimed 19 seats.  None of the individual candidates met the 3% threshold 
requirement. 
5Now that the Communist Party is in power in Moldova, the question arises:  what 
kind of government is it? Is it communist in name only, capitalizing on voter desire for 
previous stability? Or will it attempt to reverse what democratic progress has been made 
and return to a much more authoritarian mode of governance? At the time of this writing, 
December 2001, this government has been in power less than a year so it too soon to 
ascertain the long-term effects. However, conjectures can be made from examining the 
party platform and rhetoric before the elections and comparing these to the declarations 
and actions of the government since taking control. It appears that this government is 
often split on where it should stand. Sometimes they talk like hard-line communists but 
act more like social democrats, especially when dealing with international monetary 
organizations.  Other times, namely in domestic politics, the push to return to centralized 
control of politics and the economy is apparent. 
What are the implications for key political institutions necessary for democratic 
consolidation? How will the government’s behavior affect Moldova’s relations with the 
West particularly with U.S. and other international organizations? Will Moldova’s 
relationship with Moscow advance to the point of forming a new federation with Russia, 
Belarus and Moldova as members? What can the U.S. (in particular, the N.C. State 
Partnership Program) to further assist Moldova’s successful transition to a modern 
democratic nation-state?  These questions are but a few that concern both international 
and U.S. organizations working with Moldova and merit further examination.   
This thesis seeks to examine the implications of the recent elections on Moldova’s 
democratic transition and its democratic future.  It is a case study of the development of 
Moldova’s political and economic institutions since their independence in 1991, and the 
special challenges to democratic transition that a post-Soviet country like Moldova faces. 
For programs like the N.C. State Partnership Program, this thesis will be useful in 
understanding the current political situation, especially the possible impact of the 
Communist dominated government on programs such as the State Partnership Program. 
Sources for this thesis include: interviews with both U.S. government officials 
and officials working in non-governmental organizations conducted in Chisinau, the 
capital of Moldova in the summer of 2001; publications and documents detailing 
6Moldova’s current economic and political situation; and current literature of democratic 
transition.
B. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II will identify and discuss important key indicators of democratic 
transition and consolidation. The challenges associated with democratic transition are not 
unique to Moldova.  Although there is much literature discussing the challenges and 
problems associated with democratic transition, certain unique problems tend to plague 
all post-Soviet states. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, in their book Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe label the challenges specific to post-Soviet states as the “legacy of 
communism” and identify this phenomenon as a major obstacle for post-Soviet countries 
to overcome in their democratic transition and consolidation efforts.  This literature will 
be used to understand the impact of Soviet rule on Moldova’s democratic transition.  
Chapter III includes a brief historical background survey of Moldova prior to, and 
under, Soviet rule. The primary focus will be on the political and economic performance 
of the country since their 1991 independence and how Soviet regime characteristics affect 
the new regime.  
To answer the primary question of how the Communist Party regained power, 
Chapter IV will examine why the people voted the way that they did, the electoral rules, 
the appeals made by the Communist Party, the electoral results and how the votes 
translated into power. 
Chapter V focuses on the impact of the Communist government on Moldova’s 
democratic transition and consolidation. Separate sections will examine the governmental 
impact on both domestic and international affairs.  
Chapter VI, the concluding chapter, will summarize the finding of the previous 
chapters.  Finally, recommendations for governmental organizations working in Moldova 
and the North Carolina State Partnership Program will be made.  
7II. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE LEGACY OF 
COMMUNISM
A. KEY DIMENSIONS OF A CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRATIC NATION-
STATE
The last several years have provided reminders, in every corner of the 
globe, of how painful, suspenseful, and downright messy the transition to 
democracy can be.  In many states emerging from decades, if not 
centuries, of tyranny, euphoria has given way to the sobriety of the 
morning after. (Talbott 48) 
A consolidated democracy undergoes “process of achieving broad and deep 
legitimation, such that all significant political actors, both at the elite and mass levels 
believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, 
better than any other realistic alternative” (Diamond 65).  In their book Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identify five major interrelating arenas 
required for a modern consolidated democracy.  These arenas are civil society, political 
society, the rule of law, a state apparatus, and economic society.  Civil society is defined 
as “that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, 
relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan 7). Examples include social 
movements such as women’s groups, neighborhood associations, religious and 
intellectual organizations, as well as trade unions, journalists and lawyers (Linz and 
Stepan 7). Political society exists when the polity specifically “arranges itself to contest 
the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus” (Linz 
and Stepan 8).  The third arena, the rule of law is characterized by a clear hierarchy of 
laws which are interpreted by an independent judicial system, supported by a strong legal 
culture in civil society and the commitment to “self-binding” procedures of governance 
(Linz and Stepan 10).  To protect the rights of citizens and provide the basic necessary 
services, the fourth arena, the state apparatus, is needed. The state apparatus consists of a 
functioning state and a state bureaucracy that is “considered usable by the new 
democratic government,” controls the legitimate use of force in the territory, is able to 
8collect taxes to provide needed services and make and uphold laws (Linz and Stepan 11).  
The fifth and final arena is termed economic society. Economic society is defined as a set 
of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and 
regulations that mediate between the state and the market (Linz and Stepan 11). These 
arenas are interrelated and act together to properly function in a democratic system (Linz 
and Stepan 13). 
B. THE LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM 
Newly emerging democracies from the Soviet regime face some of the same 
challenges and difficulties common to many new democracies. But they also face some 
unique challenges resulting from the years of Communist totalitarian rule.  These 
“legacies of Communism” have left their mark on all five arenas of democratic 
consolidation.
The first problem, which affects all five arenas, is that these new democracies 
must simultaneously make the political transition to democracy while converting from a 
command to a market economy (Linz and Stepan 244).  In the civil society arena, the 
overwhelming majority of organizations making up the civil society, for example unions, 
cultural societies, agrarian collectives, etc., were created and maintained by the party 
state during Soviet times (Linz and Stepan 245).  Intelligence agents and citizen 
informers often infiltrated these organizations which weakened its capacity to operate 
independently and further inhibited its ability to play a significant role in the democratic 
transition. For the political society arena, decades of Soviet party state rule gave the word 
“party” a negative connotation which created problems when new political parties, a 
necessary component of democratic political representation, were organized (Linz and 
Stepan 247).
Under Stalinism, the concept of the rule of law was totally different than that of 
democracies.  Socialism was supreme over any law and there was no allowance, let alone 
a requirement for laws to constrain the party or the party leaders (Linz and Stepan 248). 
Next, in the state apparatus arena, a lack of clear distinction between the party and the 
state can disrupt the state bureaucracy’s normal functioning if the party is rejected (Linz 
9and Stepan 250). Furthermore, massive purging of loyal and effective civil servants (to 
get rid of informants) as well as the absence of any significant change can create its own 
problems.  And finally, in advanced democracies, the economic societies have been 
“socially constructed by economic incentives and a complex interplay of societal norms, 
governmental policies, and state-sanctioned rules that regulate (among other things) 
contracts, the rights and privileges of private (and public) property, and banking and 
credit systems” (Linz and Stepan 252). These minimal components did not exist in the 
Soviet command economy and create a multitude of problems for the new democracies 
when determining how to deal with democratic concepts such as privatization of state-
owned land and industries (Linz and Stepan 253).
One cannot speak of the legacy of communism without addressing the 
nationalities issue.  The breakup of the Soviet Union birthed nations with multiple parents 
made up of combined ethnic groups, which had been subjected to Stalinist “nationalities 
planning” for decades. Rogers Brubaker, in his book Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood 
and the National Question in the New Europe, described Stalin’s “nationalities planning” 
as institutionalized multinationality where the Soviet state “actively institutionalized the 
existence of multiple nations and nationalities as fundamental constituents of the state 
and its citizenry” on a sub-state rather than a state-wide level (23,27). Although the 
Soviets never sought to create a Soviet nation, they did attempt to create a statewide 
identity – the “Soviet People” (sovetskii narod) – which was considered supra-national 
rather than national (Brubaker 28).  The Soviet Union never defined the state or citizenry 
as a whole in national terms, although it did define the component parts of the citizenry in 
national terms (Brubaker 29).  The intent was to “harness, contain, channel, and control 
the potentially disruptive political expression of nationality by creating national-territorial 
administrative structures and by cultivating and co-opting, and (when they threatened to 
get out of line) repressing national elites” (Brubaker 25). The goal was to weaken 
nationalism by draining it of its content even while legitimating it as a form, and thereby 
promoting the “long-term withering away of nationality as a vital component of social 
life”  (Brubaker 25).  The unexpected results (i.e. the emerging nationalisms) of this 
grand scheme of Soviet “nationalities planning” finally contributed to the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and the effects are still being felt today. 
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Brubaker describes some of the problems resulting from three distinct, mutually 
antagonistic and interrelated nationalisms that are characteristic of post-Soviet nation-
states. He calls the relationship resulting from these nationalisms the triadic nexus.  The 
triadic nexus consists of nationalizing nationalisms, transborder or homeland 
nationalisms, and national minorities. “Nationalizing nationalisms involve claims made 
in the name of a ‘core nation’ or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply 
distinguished from the citizenry as a whole” (Brubaker 5). In the case of Moldova, this 
would apply to the ethnic Moldovans. Transborder or homeland nationalisms occur when 
a state asserts that it has the right or even the obligation to “monitor the condition, 
promote the welfare, support activities and institutions, assert the rights and protect the 
interests of their ethnonational kin” in another state and claims that these responsibilities 
transcend the boundaries of territory and citizenship (Brubaker 5).  Since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, Russia has supported ethnic Russians in Moldova, especially in the 
breakaway region of Transnistria.  National minorities (for example the ethnic Russians 
living in Moldova) have their own nationalism.  These national minorities insist the state 
recognize their distinct ethnocultural nationality and claim collective, nationality-based
cultural or political rights (Brubaker 6). The post-Soviet reorganization of political space 
has caused tens of millions of people to become residents and citizens of new states 
where they are considered as belonging to an ethnic nationality foreign to the new state 
(Brubaker 7).  This is particularly difficult for Russians who were once a privileged 
national group throughout the Soviet Union but have been transformed into minorities of 
uncertain status in non-Russian nation-states (Brubaker 7). Another problem arises from 
the discrimination suffered by the “core nationalities” during the Soviet regime.  These 
former national minorities of the Soviet state are the national majority in their own 
nation-state – a position where they can now justify compensatory projects using state 
power to promote their specific interests (Brubaker 5). 
In summary, newly democratizing nation-states like Moldova formed from the 
wreckage of former Soviet Union face many problems in political, societal, and economic 
reform. Political, civil and economic society were ruined or severely stunted by the 
Soviet system.  The rule of law as known in modern democratic systems was never 
developed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the state apparatus is hampered by a variety 
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of factors such as purges of knowledgeable and experienced civil servants or the absence 
of any change among personnel and procedures.  Finally, conflicting nationalisms, 
emerging as a result of Stalin’s institutional nationalization planning, wreaks havoc in 
many fledging democracies. Moldova suffered the same fate as many nations in Eastern 
Europe and must deal with the challenges and problems that arise from their past. 
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. MOLDOVAN HISTORY THROUGH 1991 
Moldova is one of the smallest states of the former Soviet Union.  It is 
approximately 13,000 square miles (just a little larger than the state of Maryland) and has 
a population numbering 4.5 million people.  Moldova is landlocked and is surrounded by 
Romania to the West and Ukraine in the East. The capital is Chisinau.  Moldova is an 
electoral democracy based on a multi-party system.  In July 2000, Moldova’s unicameral 
parliament opted to select the president rather than continue presidential selection via 
national referendum making Moldova a parliamentary republic. 
Today’s Moldova, an independent state since 1991, is the successor of the former 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), which was created in 1940 as a 
consequence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 (Fedor 107).  It included 
Bessarabia, historically part of the Moldovan state, and a part of the former Moldavian 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), created by Stalin in 1924 to facilitate 
communist ideological and territorial expansion to Romania (Fedor 106).   Although the 
ancestors of the current Moldovan people have lived in the area for centuries, Moldova’s 
position has long been tenuous and ambiguous.  Territorial disputes over Moldova have 
raged for centuries between Romania and Russia, including Soviet Russia and continue 
even today. 
Moldova is extremely multiethnic. Their heritage is a mixture of Romanian, Slav, 
Jewish, Turkic and Roma elements.  According to the Global Information System 
website, 2000 population figures estimate the ethnic make-up to be 64.5% 
Moldovan/Romanian, 13.8% Ukrainian, 13.0% Russian and 8.7% other.  Its religious 
composition is 97.5% Eastern Orthodox, 1.5% Jewish, and 1.0% other (“Mold.” GIS).
Their native language, Moldovan, is barely distinguishable from Romanian.  
Several switches back and forth between the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets and alternative 
attempts during Soviet times both to create a “Moldovan History” and to suppress 
Moldovan nationalism compound the confusion (King, Mold. 64-86).  In addition, as 
with other Central and Eastern European countries occupied by the Soviets, large 
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numbers of native Russians were relocated to Moldova and Moldovans were deported as 
laborers other territories of the Soviet Union.  Massive deportations to Siberia occurred in 
1940, 1944, and 1949.  An artificial famine created by Soviet leaders in 1946-48 further 
decimated the population.   
Figure 1.   Republic of Moldova.   
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While most Moldovans consider “Moldovan” to be their native tongue, Russian is 
widely spoken.  Russian has been proposed as a common intranational language, 
although Moldovan is currently the “official” language of the state.  Debate among 
Moldovans because of their various heritages continues over language and history and, 
most importantly, whether unification should be sought with Russia or Romania or 
whether Moldova should continue as an independent state.  All these factors combined to 
make defining the national identity of Moldovans extremely difficult even among the 
Moldovans themselves.   
1. Moldova before Communism 
The Latin roots of the Moldovan culture can be traced to the intermingling of 
Roman colonists and the indigenous population in ca. A.D. 105-271. Other groups, Huns, 
Ostrogoths, Slavic Antes, Bulgarians, and Mongols to name a few, traveled through the 
area between the Roman departure in A.D. 271 and the 13th century (Fedor 105).  In the 
13th and 14th centuries, the region was under Hungarian suzerainty until Prince Bogdan 
established an independent principality in 1349. Originally named Bogdania and later 
renamed Moldova, the territory stretched from the Carpathian Mountains to the Nistru 
River.  In the early 16th century, Moldova became a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire 
and remained so until 1792 when the Russians forced the Ottomans to cede their holdings 
in eastern Moldova (the area now known as Transnistria or Transdnistrea, see Figure 2) 
in the Treaty of Iasi. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, Russia annexed the 
remaining portion of Moldova (called Bessarabia) and formalized the transfer in the 
Treaty of Bucharest (Fedor 106). During the Russian occupation years, the custom of 
electing a prince to govern was reinstated. Wallachia, later to become part of Romania, 
was located on the southwest border of Bessarabia. The Wallachians shared the same 
Slavic and Roman roots with the Moldovans. In 1859, Bessarabian and Wallachian 
noblemen elected the same man prince – effectively creating a single Romanian state 
(King, Mold. 27). This uniting of Wallachia and western Moldova (Bessarabia) laid the 
foundations of modern Romania (Fedor 106). Until the early 20th century, Bessarabians 
continued to debate whether to stay united with Romania, to become independent or to 
reunite with the Russian Tsar (King, Mold. 29-30). 
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1917 and 1918 were turbulent times in the region. Tsar Nicholas II and his brother 
abdicated in March 1917, and a provisional government was established.  After the 
Bolsheviks brought down Russia’s Provisional Government in the October 1917 
revolution, the newly created Bessarabian National Council declared Bessarabia the 
independent Democratic Moldovan Republic.  Initially the independent Democratic  
Figure 2.   Modern Moldova with Bessarabia and Transnistria Annotated. 
Moldovan Republic was federated with Russia; however, in 1918, Bessarabia, “looking 
to Romania for deliverance from the triple peril of Bolshevism, Ukrainian expansionism, 
and political anarchy…declared Bessarabia’s union with Romania”(King, Mold. 34-5).  
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Neither the Soviet Union nor Western powers ever recognized the Bessarabian/Romanian 
union (King, Mold. 39). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union tried to pull 
Bessarabia back into the Union, using such tactics as deploying Bolshevik agents and 
airdropping propaganda pamphlets (King, Mold. 51).
Many Bessarabians did not eagerly accept the Romanian union. By 1930, 
Bessarabia was one of the most ethnically diverse regions in Romania – home to 352,000 
Russians, 314,000 Ukrainians, and 205,000 Jews (King, Mold. 44). The Bessarabian 
people chaffed under harsh Romanian rules and fought complete integration into Greater 
Romania (King, Mold. 43). Converting from the Orthodox Julian calendar to the 
Gregorian calendar, from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet and even adjusting to 
new shop hours made the transition difficult for the Bessarabians (King, Mold. 45). Also 
Bessarabians were not welcomed into Romanian politics. One Bessarabian writer in 1930 
commented, “We joined the Romanians…we weren’t supposed to have been conquered 
by them” (qtd. in King 43).  
Arguments continued between the Soviets and Romanians over who was legally 
entitled to Bessarabia. To add legitimacy to their claim, in 1924, the Soviets created the 
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) across the Dnestr River from 
Bessarabia on Romania’s eastern border (King, Mold. 52). The dispute continued 
throughout World War II. The Soviet Union finally emerged the victor when the 
February 1947 peace treaty established the Soviet-Romanian border along the Prut River. 
The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was comprised of six counties from 
Bessarabia and the six westernmost raions of the MASSR, plus a thin strip of territory 
east of the Dnestr River (which had never been considered part of Bessarabia) (King, 
Mold. 94). 
2. The Soviet Period 
With the Soviet Union firmly in control of the MSSR, Stalin’s “Russification” 
policy began in earnest. The policy’s goal was to destroy all remaining ties the population 
had with Romania (Fedor 107). The Cyrillic alphabet was again imposed and ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians were encouraged to migrate to Moldova. Stalin’s grain 
requisition policy along with a severe drought provoked a famine that killed at a 
minimum 115,000 Moldovans between December 1946 and August 1947 (King, Mold.
18
96). Deportations of native Moldovans were common under Stalin’s “de-kulakization” 
campaign. Between 1941 and 1951, an estimated 16,000 families were deported outside 
the MSSR, mainly to Siberia (King, Mold. 96). In the early 1950s, show trials and a 
public terror campaign against supposed pro-Romanian sympathizers claimed even more 
lives (King, Mold. 98). 
While Soviet policies to suppress nationalism were largely successful for the next 
three decades, deep resentment smoldered among Moldovans (Fedor 108). The 
resentment surfaced in the late 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and 
perestroika. “His policies…created conditions in which national feelings could be openly 
expressed and in which the Soviet Republics could consider reforms” (Fedor 108).  
With dissolution of the Soviet Union on the horizon came increased political 
assertiveness in Moldova. In 1989, the Moldovan Popular Front formed as an association 
of political and independent cultural groups (Fedor 109). Romanian was declared the 
official language, and this sparked opposition from Russian, Slavic, and Turkic minorities 
(Fedor 109-10). In February and March 1990, the Moldovan Popular Front won a 
majority of votes in the first democratically held elections, and in May, it declared 
Moldova’s independence. In September 1990, Mircea Snegnur, a communist, became the 
president of the newly formed Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. 
3. Independence And Turmoil 
In August 1990, the Turkic minority in southern Moldova declared a separate 
“Gagauz Republic.” Slavs on the east bank of the Nistru River (Transnistria) declared 
their own “Dnestr Republic” in September 1990. Despite the opposition of Moldova’s 
Supreme Soviet, both “republics” held presidential elections in December 1991. For 
many Moldovan intellectuals, the separatist actions of Gagauz and Transnistria 
undermined the cultural renaissance initiated in 1988 and threatened to break apart the 
republic (King, Mold. 152). Widespread violence erupted when the Moldovan 
government sent approximately 50,000 armed Moldovan nationalist volunteers to quell 
the “uprisings in the republics.” The 14th Russian Army intervened to stop the violence 
and to facilitate negotiations between the Moldovan government and the renegade 
republics. These negotiations failed, and the Moldovan government refused to join in 
further negotiations (Fedor 110).
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In May 1991, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova officially changed its 
name to the Republic of Moldova and the Supreme Soviet was changed to the Moldovan 
Parliament. On August 27, 1991, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence 
from the Soviet Union. However, disagreement among Moldovans continued on whether 
Moldova should remain independent, seek a new union with Russia (CIS) or reunite with 
Romania. Snegur and most Moldovan political elites favored a “two-states” doctrine: 
maintaining complete sovereignty while cultivating strong cultural ties with Romania 
(King, Mold. 150). 
Tension between the Republic of Moldova’s government in Chisinau and the 
Dnestr and Gagauz “republics” continued. Violence again erupted in Transnistria in 
1992. In a cease-fire agreement negotiated in July 1992, peacekeeping forces were 
formed from Moldovan, Russian and Transnistrian forces to maintain a demarcation line. 
Transnistria was also awarded a special status within Moldova and would be allowed to 
secede if Moldova decided to reunite with Romania (Fedor 111). 
The situation in the south unfolded quite differently. Although, the Gagauz 
leaders had declared an independent “Gagauz republic,” they did not seek complete 
separation from Moldova. A form of territorial autonomy was created for southern 
Moldova that empowered district councils and local government and facilitated the 
devolution of political power (King, Mold. 217-18). In December 1994, the Moldovan 
Parliament, with Gagauz leadership support, adopted a law that “granted wide-ranging 
powers to local officials,” endowing them with power over local resources, economic and 
judicial matters, and other areas (King, Mold. 218-19). The Moldovan government would 
maintain control over major functions such as citizenship, foreign policy, currency issue 
and circulation, and national security (King, Mold. 219).
To avert fear caused by the government’s declaration of Moldovan (or Romanian) 
as the state language, three languages – Moldovan, Russian, and Gagauz – were all made 
official languages in the Gagauz. The Gagauz would retain the right of self-determination 
in the event that Moldova’s status changed, presumably by uniting with Russia or 
Romania. 
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B. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FROM 1991 – 
2001
1. An Economic Overview of the 1990s  
Moldova is an overwhelmingly agriculturally based society.  It has good farmland 
and a moderate climate but no major mineral deposits.  Its main crops are wheat, corn, 
barley, soybeans, tobacco and grapes grown for wine production.  Beef and dairy cattle 
are also raised.  Moldova has no fuel or energy reserves and therefore must import almost 
all its energy resources.  Energy shortages contributed to serious production declines after 
1991.  Some light industry exists, mostly small appliance production, agricultural 
machinery, foundry equipment, refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, hosiery, shoes, 
textiles, and sugar and vegetable oil production.  Exports include foodstuffs, canned 
goods, tractors, washing machines and freezers. Moldova’s main trading partners are 
Russia, Romania, Germany, Ukraine, Italy, and Belarus.  Russia is by far the leading 
trading partner, receiving 41% of Moldova’s exports and providing 21% of Moldova’s 
imports (“World Factbook”).  40% of Moldova’s industry is located in Transnistria, a 
region that is not controlled by the central government in Chisinau. 
From 1990 until 1996, Moldova made many positive steps with its economic 
reforms in the areas of land and property privatization, and import and export market 
reforms among others.  National privatization was substantially completed by 1995 and 
post-privatization enterprises were underway.  Over 70% of homes and apartments were 
now privately owned and 2/3 of the non-agricultural economy had been transferred to the 
private sector (“Mold.” USAID; ”Mold.” GIS). Seventy-five percent of agricultural land, 
concentrated in 989 large collective farms was distributed to approximately 800,000 
individual farmers.  In other reforms, prices were freed and export taxes were abolished, 
preferential credits to state enterprises were stopped, and interest rates freed.  Initial 
success in economic reforms was rewarded when the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (a division of the World Bank Group) invested $232 million and 
allocated $135 million for eight investment projects to be initiated in 1996 (“Mold.” 
GIS).  Also in 1995, Moldova joined the Council of Europe.  A 1996 USAID report noted 
that tight fiscal and monetary policy had brought inflation down and that the currency had 
maintained “remarkable stability” (“Mold.” USAID).  
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Unfortunately, these positive steps forward could not stem the rising tide of 
economic disaster.  Moldovan industry, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, was 
oriented toward supplying the Soviet military machine. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, an efficient conversion of the military-oriented industries to other enterprises 
failed. The ambitious industrial privatization program, centered on “vouchers” and aimed 
at giving everyone a chance to become a “capitalist,” did not improve corporate 
management and, in fact, hindered both domestic and international investment in private 
companies (Barbarosie, “Anticipated”).  The privatization of key industries, namely wine, 
tobacco and the energy sectors, was delayed, leading to their rapid deterioration and
lessening their attractiveness for investors.  Even the agricultural privatization process, 
considered technically successful simply because of its occurrence, had a downside.  The 
new farms, parcels of only 1-2 hectares, were too small to allow efficient agricultural 
production.
In 1996, the Gross Domestic Product decreased by 9% and inflation rose to 16% 
(“Mold.” GIS).  Several factors contributed to the decline including the complicated 
political situation (i.e. several leadership changes in the first years following 
independence) and the political and military conflict with Transnistria (Fedor 132). Much 
of Moldova’s industrial capacity is located in Transnistria and the disruption of 
traditional economic ties with enterprises there has negatively affected the economy of 
the country as a whole (Fedor 132). Another factor that contributed to Moldova’s 
economic downturn was that the economy was firmly embedded in the broader structures 
of the former Soviet Union resulting in damage from the breakdown in inter-republic 
trade, sudden increases in external prices, and inflation caused by the Russian 
government’s practice of printing large amounts of money (Moldova retained the Russian 
ruble as its currency until November 1993) (Fedor 132).  Making an already dismal 
situation worse, in 1994 and 1996, Moldova was subject to droughts, severely affecting 
agricultural production. 
In 1997, no economic growth was recorded and little prospect for future 
improvement was expected (“Mold.” GIS).  In June 1997, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rejected Moldova’s request to enter the WTO. Moldova began its accession 
process to become a member of the WTO in 1994.  “Accession to the WTO requires full 
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respect of WTO rules and disciplines…(WTO Ministerial Declaration, May 25, 1998). 
To this end, the WTO membership generally requires the acceding countries to reform 
their economies and enhance the transparency of their trade regimes in accordance with 
WTO rules during the accession process” (qtd. in Ackerman 2). Although Moldova made 
some progress in implementing market-based economic reforms and private ownership, it 
was not one of the two countries of the group of 32 candidates that successfully 
completed their accession negotiations in 1997 through substantial economic and trade 
reforms prior to accession.2
Russia, Moldova’s leading trade partner, experienced a severe economic 
downturn in 1998, compounding Moldova’s economic troubles.  In an attempt to halt the 
economic decline, in July 1998 the Moldovan Parliament approved a toughened budget 
process, but failed to include unpopular price increases.  During the first half of 1998, the 
government collected only 55% of projected tax revenues and only 1/3 of projected 
annual revenues (“Mold.” GIS).  As of 1999, Moldova owed 1.3 billion dollars to foreign 
creditors, including GAZPROM (a Russian Gas Company), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“Mold.” 
GIS).
As of January 2001, the Moldovan lei traded at 13.10 lei to the U.S. dollar 
(“Mold.” GIS).  Its initial exchange value in 1993 was 3.85 lei to the U.S. dollar. Ninety 
percent of the population, numbering 4.5 million, lives on less than 12 lei ($1 USD) per 
day.  Pensioners average only 82 lei ($7 USD) monthly. Eighty percent live below 
subsistence level – that is, on less than 233 lei ($20 USD) per month (Barbarosie, 
“Understanding”).  The average salary covers only 40% of basic necessities, wages have 
lagged behind the inflation rate, and real income per capita has sharply declined. Wage 
arrears, sometimes by two to three months, exacerbate the problem.   
Obviously, Moldova’s economy did not improve with its democratic transition 
(see Table 1).3  The real GDP in 1999 was 33.7% of the 1990 level.  As described in the 
2 Moldova was finally able to complete the WTO’s reform requirements and in May 2001 was allowed 
to join. 
3 The text provided with inflation figures listed in Table 1 did not include an explanation of the 
exorbitant annual inflation rate noted for 1993. 
23
Wall Street Journal, “ Moldova’s improvised, political and managerial classes failed to 
pursue market reforms with any consistency.  That failure led to economic collapse and 
general pauperization, which the electorate perceived to consequences of market 
economics, not of the absence thereof” (qtd. in Barbarosie, “Understanding”).  Moldova, 
a country described by the Economist as, a “model of correct reform and a perfect 
laboratory for running reforms,” became a model of stagnation setting the stage for the 
Communist party to gain control of the government in 2001 (qtd. in Barbarosie, 
“Understanding”).
Economic Indicators in Moldova, 1993–2000
Indicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a
Real GDP growth rate 
(%)
-1.2 -30.9 -1.4 -5.9 1.6 -6.5 -4.4 0 
Annual inflation rate 
(%)
2,707.2 104.6 23.8 1.1 11.1 18.2 43.8 31.3 
Exchange rate 
(lei/$US)  
3.64 4.27 4.50 4.65 4.66 8.32 11.59 12.3 
Statistics from Arcadie Barbarosie’s article titled “Understanding the Communist 
Election Victory in Moldova.”  The World Bank Group’s Transition Newsletter.
Source: Moldovan Economic Trends, Department of Statistical and Sociological 
Analysis.
Table 1.   Economic Indicators in Moldova, 1993-2000. 
2. Social Challenges  
Another serious problem for Moldova is the number of citizens leaving the 
country to seek employment elsewhere.  According to Valeri Patrashko, Chief of the 
Bureau for Foreign Passports, the most popular destinations to immigrate are places with 
good economies such as the U.S., Israel and Germany, although Russia and Ukraine are 
also popular (Ryabkov).  In the beginning of the 1990s, the most popular country to 
immigrate to was Israel. In 2001, Russia was the choice destination (see Table 2).  
Patrashko noted that in the early 1990s, Moldovans left because of the “destabilized 
political situation; now they are leaving because of the deep crisis in the 
economy…”(Ryabkov). Most of the immigrants are healthy, young, educated people 
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under forty years of age, who believe they can find a better life, make use of their 
abilities, find better work and bigger salaries elsewhere. On the other hand, pensioners, 
who may still claim Russian citizenship, try to move to Russia where their pension is 
worth much more.  Between 1990-2000, 100,644 Moldovans were officially granted 
permission to leave the country permanently, however, there was no estimate on the 
number of Moldovans who have left the country without permission (Ryabkov).   
Moldovan Immigration Statistics 1990-2000 
Country Year 
1990 1991 1998 1999 2000 
U.S.      726 2,418 1,980 1,465 1,267
Israel 23,933 14,738   920 1,620 1,236
Germany     667     799 2,012 1,683 1,496
Russia - -    611 1,127 3,290
Ukraine - -    563 1,287 2,025
Total 25,597 18,218 5,909 7,700 9,881
Bureau For Foreign Passports, Moldova. 
Table 2.   Moldovan Immigration Statistics 1990-2000
Additionally, debate still continues over whether Moldovan or Romanian will be 
the official language. This argument is difficult for outsiders to understand since 
Moldovan and Romanian are essentially the same language.  Nevertheless, this argument 
has caused great emotional and even political rifts among the Moldovan people. 
Additionally, the question of whether Russian should be a second official language adds 
to the tension. Nationalists prefer Moldovan only as the official language. Russian-
speaking minorities are demanding that Russian be reinstated, making it one of two 
official languages. 
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3. The 1990s – A Political Overview 
Economic problems are not the only challenges that the fledging democracy must 
address. Despite special accommodations for Transnistria in the 1994 Constitutional 
Amendments, the unresolved status of Transnistria continues to be the most serious 
political problem. Russian troops still remain at the insistence of the Transnistrians, 
causing tension with the Chisinau government.4  The Transnistria situation has been 
identified by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other 
international organizations as one that must be solved before Moldova will be able to 
adequately address its other problems (“OSCE”).
Another problem for the nascent democracy is that Moldova’s political system is 
perpetually in a campaign mode. The presidency, parliament, and local government were 
all formed at different times between 1989 and 1991.  Elections at both national and local 
levels have never been coordinated, resulting in at least one major election every year 
between 1991 and 2000. The constant election cycle has made economic and political 
problems difficult to address since few political figures have been willing to make major 
decisions (especially unpopular decisions needed for economic reform) that could be 
used against them or their party in the next election (King, Mold. 161).
The 1994 Constitution originally designated Moldova a parliamentary democracy 
with a unicameral assembly and a popularly elected president. A power-sharing 
arrangement was formed between the Parliament and the President. The President would 
oversee foreign policy, defense policy, and national security issues; and he would 
nominate the Prime Minister. The President could dismiss ministers with the approval of 
the Prime Minister. The Parliament would approve all ministerial posts and the 
government program and would be elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms.  
Six governments held power between Moldova’s independence in 1991 and 2001. 
The first, the Government of Valeriu Muravschi, former minister of finance, lasted from 
Jun 1991-1992.  The government of Premier Muravschi and President Mircea Snegur 
4 In November 2001, positive steps toward withdrawing the Russian soldiers and removing the 
stockpile of weapons stored in Transnistria commenced, and Russia’s support for the separatist government 
appears to waning. Good relations between President Voronin and Russia’s President Vladmir Putin may 
have tipped the scale towards Russia’s support of a Federalist Moldova.   
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initiated actions with international organizations. In 1992, Moldova entered the United 
Nations, and began working with the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development (Gudim). Even so, the economic statistics remained grim (see previous 
section). In addition to Moldova’s economic problems in 1992, a civil war broke out in 
March, splitting the country and pitting Moldovan nationalists against the Transnistrian 
separatists. Trouble had been brewing since Transnistria declared its independence from 
Moldova in September 1991 – a declaration that has never been recognized by the 
Moldovan government.  The civil war lasted until July 1992 and ended in a victory for 
the Russian-supported Transnistrian separatists when Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
pressured Moldovan President Snegur into accepting a cease-fire and the stationing of a 
Russian peacekeeping force in the Transnistrian region.  These factors combined resulted 
in the Muravschi government’s demise only one year.  
From the left-wing Agrarian Party, the Parliament selected Andrei Sangheli, as 
Muravschi’s successor. In his four and half years in office (June 1992 – February 1997), 
Sangheli’s government embarked on program of economic reform including the first 
program of stabilization (1993); introduction of the Moldovan Leu; small business 
legislation (1994); industrial enterprise restructuring (1995); free trade zones (1996); and 
mass privatization of state owned businesses and housing among others (Gudim).  
Muravschi enjoyed support from the Agrarian and Socialist coalition in parliament, 
making his programs and policies easier to implement. Muravschi’s “plan for 
macrostabilization” began to work:  inflation was brought under control, the state budget 
deficit was decreased, and the Leu was stable.  The London-based publication The
Economist called Moldova “a country of sound reforms” (qtd. in Gudim). Sadly, as the 
Moldovan case illustrates, merely implementing structural reforms does not guarantee 
economic growth. The shadow economy flourished taking with it revenues sorely needed 
by the government, financial capital went abroad, political favors and group interests 
affected government decisions and corruption grew to disastrous proportions (Gudim). 
In the 1996 presidential elections, Petru Lucinschi, first secretary of the 
Community Party during the Soviet period, defeated Communist Party candidate 
Vladimir Voronin with 54% of the vote in the second round of voting (King, “Nations” 
274). Fifteen parties participated in the March 1998 parliamentary elections.  Based on 
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the country’s system of proportional representation and closed party lists, only four 
parties reached the four percent threshold required to gain seats in the Parliament.  The 
Communist Party, in their first parliamentary election since 1991, received 40 seats – 
making it the largest bloc (King, “Nations” 274).  A non-Communist coalition 
government – the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms – was formed from the Christian 
Democratic Popular Party (26 seats, rightest and Pro-Romanian), the Democratic Party 
(24 seats, support base for President Lucinschi) and the Party of Democratic Forces (11 
seats, moderately Pro-Romanian) (King “Nations” 274). However, infighting among 
coalition members made the selection of ministers and government officials contentious.  
Three significant developments occurred on the political scene in 1999.  First, 
during local elections in May and June 1999, the Communists increased their already 
significant representation on local councils and mayoral seats. The increase in 
Communist influence threatened the non-Communist parties and President Lucinschi and 
created the specter of the return to Communist power.  Second, the “energetic leadership 
style and reform orientation” of Prime Minister Ion Sturza threatened the powers that 
Lucinschi already held (King, “Nations” 275).  Sturza accelerated Moldova’s reform 
efforts and garnered praise from Western governments and international lending agencies 
for his reforms.  Lucinschi, determined to oust Sturza, quietly urged his own supporters 
in parliament to pass a no-confidence vote for Sturza’s government, which they did on 
November 9, 1999 (King, “Nations” 275).  A serious economic crisis ultimately resulted 
from the Sturza government’s fall:  alarmed at the imminent demise of the Sturza 
government and the failure of the Parliament to approve wine and tobacco industry 
privatization, the IMF suspended its program in Moldova on November 5; on November 
8, the World Bank followed suit and postponed its structural adjustment credit agreement.  
Third, tiring of the Parliament’s constant bickering and yearning for the strong executive 
powers existing in other former Soviet states, Lucinschi began to seek similar 
constitutional reforms for Moldova (King, “Nations” 275). 
4. Sweeping Political Change in 1999-2001 
In May 1999, President Petru Lucinschi initiated a non-binding referendum, 
asking voters to choose between the existing system and a new presidential system.  The 
new presidential system would allow the president to serve as the effective head of 
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government and hold the power to name and dismiss individual ministers (in contrast to 
the existing system, under which individual ministers were nominated by the Prime 
Minister and then approved by the Parliament).  The referendum results demonstrated 
strong public support for increasing presidential powers.  Of participating voters, most 
opted for the presidential system (King, “Nations” 275).  However, a voter turnout of 
only 55% did not meet the 60% voter participation requirement for the referendum to be 
valid.5
Despite public opinion, in July 2000 the Parliament voted to change Moldova’s 
form of government to a parliamentary republic.  The Parliament voted overwhelmingly 
to abolish the direct election for president (the next such election would have been held in 
December 2000), allowing the Parliament to select the President rather than the voters 
and severely limiting the powers and responsibilities of the President.  This made 
Moldova the only country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) not to elect 
its president by direct vote.  Under the new legislation, a three-fifths vote in parliament is 
required to select a new president.  If the required votes could not be secured for one 
candidate after four attempts, the parliament would be dissolved and new elections held.  
President Lucinschi responded by exercising his veto power to halt the legislation. The 
Parliament, which was then dominated by opponents of President Lucinschi, promptly 
overturned his veto, forcing him to sign the legislation into law or resign. On July 26, 
2000, President Lucinschi signed the constitutional changes into law (see Table 3). 
The dissolution of parliament owing to the non-selection of a president came 
quickly to Moldova. On December 27, 2000, after four unsuccessful attempts to elect a 
new president, President Lucinschi officially dissolved the Parliament. Early 
parliamentary elections, originally planned for February 2002, were scheduled for 
February 2001.  The Moldova Communist Party (PCM - Partidul Comunistilor din 
Moldova) won a majority of seats in the February 26, 2001, national Parliamentary 
elections. On April 4, 2001, Vladimir Voronin was elected President of Moldova by 
Parliament, making him the first communist president of Moldova. 
5 In November 1999, the Constitutional Court declared the referendum illegal citing the fact that the 
president may initiate a referendum, but only the parliament may administer the referendum. 
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Constitutional Changes, July 2000 
1994 Constitution  2000 Amendments  
President elected by popular 
vote in two-round majority 
system.
President elected by three-fifths vote of parliament.
Presidential candidates must be 
at least 35 years old.
Presidential candidates must be at least 40 years old.
Referendum necessary for 
presidential dismissal.
President dismissed by parliament with approval of 
constitutional court.
President names prime minister. 
Prime minister and government 
approved by parliament.
President names prime minister after consulting with 
parliamentary factions. Prime minister and 
government approved by parliament. President has 
power to change individual ministers only on proposal 
of prime minister.
President can attend government 
meetings and chairs the sessions 
when in attendance.
President does not participate in government sittings. 
Prime minister chairs sessions.
n/a Government has power to issue decrees.
President names two of the six 
justices on the constitutional 
court.
Government names the two justices. The other four 
named by parliament and magistrates.
President has power to initiate 
constitutional amendments.
President has no such power.
Freedom House Report, Nations In Transit 2001: Moldova. 
Table 3.   Constitutional Changes, July 2000 
30
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
31
IV. WHY THE COMMUNIST PARTY WON 
Four themes resonate throughout the documents written about the Communist 
Party victory in February 2001. These themes are: the severe economic situation and its 
impact on the voters, the impact of the electoral rules, the Communist campaign appeals, 
and citizen disillusionment with democratic reforms. Moldova’s severe economic 
situation and the impact that this situation had on the majority of the populace appears to 
be the primary cause of the overwhelming Communist Party victory. Other factors 
increased the Communist Party appeal including a campaign platform that promised 
solutions to both social and economic problems, which was highly appealing considering 
the widespread disillusionment with failed or inadequate democratic reforms.  Finally, 
the structure of the electoral system contributed led to the Communist Party’s return to 
power.  It is important to recognize that only by the combination of all these factors that 
the Communist Party achieved its overwhelming victory. 
A. PUBLIC OPINION, PAUPERIZATION AND THE DISILLUSIONMENT 
WITH DEMOCRACY 
The first and possibly most important factor that contributed to the rapid rise of 
the Communist Party’s popularity was “the total pauperization of the population” 
(Barbarosie, “Anticipated”).  As demonstrated in Chapter III, the vast majority (80%) of 
Moldova’s population was living below subsistence level in 2001. A public opinion poll 
conducted in January 2001 indicated that Moldovans were extremely dissatisfied with 
their economic situation and that they expected to government to do something about it.  
In this poll, Moldovans were asked what issues concerned them most.  Moldovans 
indicated that they were most concerned with poverty, the future of their children, prices, 
famine and unemployment, while concerns about health, crime and corruption ranked 
lower (“Barometer–2001”).6  When asked about their income, 51.5% of the people polled 
responded that their income was not enough to cover their essential needs and 36% 
believed that their income was sufficient only for essential needs.  Only 12% believed 
that they had sufficient income to provide anything more than basic needs.  The attitude 
that the state should provide for the people’s basic needs still exists even though over a 
6 All Public Opinion Poll information in this section comes from the 2001 Barometer of Public 
Opinion Polls commissioned by the Institute for Public Policy, Chisinau, Moldova. 
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decade has passed since Soviet rule ended; sixty-seven percent believe that people are 
poor because the state does not help them enough.  The combination of citizens unhappy 
with their standard of living and dissatisfied pensioners gave the Communist Party a 
sizeable social basis to cultivate support. 
Because of poor economic conditions since 1991 and especially since the 
economic disaster in 1998, many Moldovans equate bad times with democracy, 
democratic institutions and democratic reforms.  Their faith that democratic institutions 
(or at least elected officials representing the institutions) will provide and ensure quality 
governance, law and order, social protection, and basic rights, liberties, and standards of 
living has lessened since the euphoria of becoming independent from the Soviet Union 
has waned. (See Table 4.) 






















Governance 2% 3% 14% 42% 35% 4% 100% 
Observation 
of Order and 
Legislation 




1% 3% 7% 50% 36% 3% 100% 
Rights and 
Liberties 2% 13% 13% 41% 28% 3% 100% 
Living
Standards 1% 2% 3% 41% 52% 1% 100% 
Statistics from the Institute of Public Policy, Moldova. 
Table 4.   Barometer of Public Opinion - January 2001. 
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Confusion stemming from a lack of understanding basic democratic principles 
and how economic reforms work to encourage economic growth appears to exist both 
among the general population and government policymakers alike. For instance, although 
64% of Moldovans polled believe that a market economy is good to have, only 19% feel 
that privatization allows common people to make a decent living and 45% believe that 
privatization is a means of transferring wealth into the hands of prominent people 
(“Barometer–2001”).  According to the Wall Street Journal, “Moldova’s improvised, 
political and managerial classes failed to pursue market reforms with any consistency.  
That failure led to economic collapse and general pauperization, which the electorate 
perceived to be consequences of market economics, not of the absence thereof” (qtd. in 
Barbarosie, “Understanding”).  (See Figure 3.) 
Figure 3.   “Doctor, these pills (i.e. prescription for reform) have no positive effect...” – A. 
Dimitrov. 
Another interesting factor is that although Moldovans profess to distrust 
politicians and have equated democracy with bad times, 67.52 % of registered voters cast 
ballots in the February 2001 elections (“Parliamentary” 3). (66.70% of registered voters 
cast ballots in the 2000 Presidential Election in the US.) The healthy voter turnout 
demonstrates support for the democratic institution of electoral representation even 
though a large number of votes cast went to a party that does not usually champion 
democratic causes.  
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B. CAMPAIGN APPEALS
As of January 2001, the Communist Party had the highest confidence level of any 
political party.  Even so, only 23.1 % believed the Communist Party could address 
current problems.  Indeed, 31.7% believed that no party is able to contribute to the 
process of overcoming the current crisis.  Fourteen and a half percent expressed 
confidence in other parties, such as the National Liberty Party, the Democratic Party from 
Moldova, the Popular Christian Democratic Party, and the Party of Rebirth and 
Conciliation.  The only other party to receive a confidence rating any higher than 5% was 
the electoral block Braghis Alliance which received a confidence rating of only 5.3%. 
(“Baro. Jan. 01”) 
Despite the disastrous economic situation, not one of the far or center right parties 
(Party of Democratic Forces, Christian Democrat People’s Party, the Democratic Party, 
Rebirth and Conciliation of Moldova) put domestic matters at the top of its agenda 
(“Moldova 2001”). Although all these parties mentioned social issues in their campaign 
platforms, none clearly made improving the social welfare of the people a top priority 
(“Elect. P.F.D.,” “Elect. DP,” “Elect. CP,” “Elect. CDPP,” “Elect. BA,” “Party”). 
The Party of Democratic Forces (P.F.D.) was considered moderately Pro-
Romanian.  The Electoral Program of the P.F.D. maintained an anti-communist/anti-
authoritarian platform.  They attempted to capitalize on the fear of the  “liquidation of the 
independence of the Republic of Moldova through its dissolving into the Russian-Belarus 
Union, through denationalization of the population of our country according to the soviet 
model” (“Elect. P.F.D.”). The main initiatives of P.F.D. were: ensuring social security of 
the citizens; combating poverty through economic growth; law enforcement and a real, 
efficient fight against corruption and organized crime; continuing and finalizing the 
reforms in order to provide a decent level of life of the population; establishment of the 
State of Law and the Civil Society; respecting human rights and historically established 
spiritual and moral values (trust in god, family durability); guaranteeing and defending 
private property of the citizens; and gradual adherence of the Republic of Moldova to the 
European Union (“Elect. P.F.D.”).
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The Christian Democrat People’s Party (CDPP) was a far-right party favoring 
integration with Romania.  Its strategic objectives were the following: fighting corruption 
and delinquency, alleviation of poverty, creation of conditions to ensure a sustainable 
economic development, support of agricultural producers and the middle class, 
strengthening and improving the public administration system, and integration in the 
regional and European economic system. The CDPP advocated a “rapid, consequent and 
coherent promotion of reforms [as] necessary to attain the proposed objectives and 
alleviate the profound crisis provoked by previous governments. CDPP shall adopt and 
implement economic and social policies to ensure conditions for a stable economic 
growth and a sustained improvement of the quality of life” (“Elect. CDPP”). 
The Democratic Party (DP) was the support base for Former President Lucinschi 
(King “Nations” 274). The DP campaign platform focused primarily on business and 
economic issues. Establishing a favorable business environment, observing rights on 
property, ensuring equal opportunities to competitors, non-regulation of the economy, 
modernizing the banking system, and developing a securities market and investment 
institutions were listed as top priorities (“Elect. DP”). Although improving living 
standards and education were outlined in the section titled “Social policy,” it was listed 
after long sections outlining its strategy for Macroeconomic policy and Structural policy. 
The Party for Rebirth and Concilliation of the Republic of Moldova (PRC) 
campaign focused on promoting through concepts and concrete actions the values of 
democracy and the state and utilizing the rule of law and economic and social liberties to 
ensure security of human rights and liberties (civil, political, economic and social), 
plurality, constructive dialogue, and competition of ideas and deeds, treating them as an 
instrument to achieve real modernization of the Moldovan society (“Party”). The PRC 
supported the market economy policy and pointed out that “bearing in mind the limited 
public financial resources, pleads for the installation of an efficient mechanism of social 
security, preferentially oriented towards social assistance of families, children, the 
elderly, handicapped persons and vulnerable layers of society” (“Party”). 
The overall objective of Braghis Alliance bloc, as stated in its published campaign 
platform, consisted of the following statements: “sustainable development of the 
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Moldovan State, democratic society establishment, political and territorial unification of 
the country, resurrection of spiritual cohesion of the nation, dynamic development of a 
socially oriented, free market economy, realization of real democracy, criminality and 
poverty eradication” (“Elect. BA.”).
The Communist Party campaign platform, which focused on solving domestic 
problems and the widespread opinion among citizens that life was simply better prior to 
1991, translated into increased voter support of the Communist Party in the 2001 
elections. The Communist Party (CP) campaign slogan “Communists in power - Order in 
the country, Welfare in families!” set the tone for a campaign designed to address the 
concerns of the people. The top four priorities were listed as:  (1) strengthening the 
sovereignty and statehood of the Republic of Moldova, recovering its territorial integrity; 
(2) pursuing an economic course to revive the economy and give every individual the 
opportunity to work, support his/her family, study and have a materially ensured old age; 
(3) stopping with all firmness the robbery of the republic and the corruption; and (4) 
recovering the power of the people, social justice and interethnic understanding in the 
society (“Elect. CP”). Campaign promises included: raising pensions and salaries paid to 
teachers, doctors, and cultural workers; price controls on power resources, utilities, main 
food products and consumer goods and drugs; reinstating the health insurance system 
created during Soviet times; and expanding access to free medical care.  The CP singled 
out children, pensioners and veterans for special consideration, and proposed setting up a 
fund to assist single mothers and families with many children (“Elect. CP”).  
The difference between the campaign platforms of the CP and the non-
Communist parties is rather striking. Not only does it appear that the CP took note of 
citizen concerns expressed in the 2000 Public Opinion Polls, but actually designed its 
campaign platform to address many of those concerns. The CP platform was rather short 
(compared to the long, detailed publications of the other parties) and concise.  In contrast 
with other parties, the CP not only successfully articulated its goals and objectives 
clearly– with domestic issues plainly a top priority – but it also outlined sources for funds 
to pay for its proposals.
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The CP platform struck a more positive tone than any of the other parties. “We 
are certain: Life will be fine!”  “Together we will ensure order in the country and well-
being in every house!” These slogans were reminiscent of Herbert Hoover’s promise to 
Americans guaranteeing “a chicken in every pot; a car in every garage.” That slogan 
appealed to Americans in 1928 just as the CP campaign slogans appealed to Moldovans 
in 2001.
C. IMPACT OF ELECTORAL RULES AND HOW THE VOTES 
TRANSLATED INTO POWER 
In the spring of 2000, the Moldovan Parliament voted to increase the electoral 
threshold for parties to win seats in a parliamentary election from four percent to six 
percent (King, “Nations” 276). This increase, designed to encourage voters to form larger 
parties and to encourage small parties to form coalitions, effectively prevented 14 parties 
and movements from winning representation in the Parliament (Barbarosie, 
“Understanding”). Only three political parties were able to overcome the six-percent 
threshold and to claim a percentage of the 101 available seats.  The Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (CDPP) received 8.24% of the votes and claimed 11 seats.  The Electoral 
Bloc “Braghis Alliance” (EBBA) captured 13.36% of the votes and claimed 19 seats. 
And in what appeared to be a landslide victory, the Communist Party won 71 seats with 
50.07% of the votes (See Table 5.)  None of the individual candidates met the 3% 
threshold required to gain entry into the Parliament. This cartoon (see Figure 4) appeared 
on the ADEPT (Association for Participatory Democracy) Website and illustrates the 
difficulty that almost all the parties had in scaling the “6% wall” to gain entry into the 
Parliament.  
The election code provides for a pure proportional system using the d’Hondt 
method for apportioning seats.  Votes cast for parties that do not receive 6% of the votes 
or individuals that do not receive 3% of the votes are proportionally divided among the 
parties that do overcome the threshold. The result was a tremendous number of votes cast 
in this election – close to 30% – were not represented at all in parliament.  This 
reapportionment of votes meant that the Communist Party, which initially won fifty-one 
seats according to votes cast for the Communist Party, ended up with twenty additional 
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seats in the Parliament, giving it more than the number of votes needed both to elect the 
president (3/5 majority or 61 votes) and to amend the constitution (68 votes). 
Moldovan Parliamentary Elections, 25 February 2001
Electoral Contestants Number of 
Votes
Percentage Number of Mandates 
(Seats)
Communist Party 794,808 50.07% 71 
Braghis Alliance 212,071 13.36% 19 
Christian Democratic People’s 
Party
130,810 8.24% 11 
Party for Rebirth and 
Conciliation 
91,894 5.79% 0 
Democratic Party 79,757 5.02% 0 
National Liberal Party 44,548 2.81% 0 
Social Democratic Party of 
Moldova
39,247 2.47% 0 
Party for Democratic Forces 19,405 1.22 0 
Other Parties and Independent 
Candidates
Not available 11.02 0 
Totals 1,412,540 100% 101 
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report. 
Table 5.   Moldovan Parliamentary Elections, 25 February 2001. 
The significance of the change in the electoral law was that had the previous four-
percent threshold been still been in effect, five parties would have received seats in the 
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Parliament. Instead of twenty-nine seats (representing votes cast for parties that did not 
overcome the threshold) apportioned among three parties, eighteen seats would have been 
apportioned among five parties. The Communist Party would control 62 seats, enough to 
control the election of the President, but not enough for a constitution-amending majority. 
This would have encouraged coalition building and cooperation among parties in the 
Parliament. 
Figure 4.   “The Six-percent Wall” – A. Dimitrov 
The single constituency for the entire country makes it difficult to achieve 
regional or ethnic representation.  It also frees politicians from responsibility to any 
particular constituency.  The Law on Political Parties amended in 1999 required that 
political parties or socio-political groups register at least 5,000 members from six out of 
the twelve electoral districts in the country (“Parliamentary” 2).  Significantly, this 
system makes it almost impossible for ethnically-based parties representing locally 
concentrated groups, such as that in Gaugazia, to gather enough support from other 
districts to register their parties, making it much easier for more widely-appealing parties 
to dominate the country (“Parliamentary” 2).   
Despite the high threshold and the single constituency, the OSCE Office for 
Democratic and Human rights determined that Moldova met international standards for 
democratic elections, and that “Moldova’s election code provides an adequate framework 
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for political parties and electoral blocs to enter the political arena on an equal basis” 
(“Parliamentary” 1).  These are the third parliamentary elections held since Moldova’s 
independence in 1991. As in previous elections, vote counting was completed in a 
transparent manner, the election results were accepted and a smooth change of power 
occurred (“Parliamentary” 1-2).   
 In summary, the factors leading to victory for the Communist Party in the 
February 2001 elections were indeed interconnected. However, the overwhelming victory 
enjoyed by the Communist Party resulted from the peculiarities in Moldova’s election 
system and was not really the landslide that appeared to be.  In fact, almost as many 
people (49%) voted against the Communist Party as voted for them (51%). The 
“landslide victory” occurred because thirty percent of votes cast were for parties or 
individuals that did not meet the minimum threshold to gain entry into the Parliament 
resulting in twenty additional seats awarded to the Communist Party. Finding themselves 
in dire economic straits, a vast number of voters were attracted to the Communist 
campaign platform, which promised to alleviate many of their problems.  Finally, many 
citizens, disillusioned with the apparent ineffectiveness of democratic reforms, which 
they equated to “democracy” and democratic parties, voted for the Communist Party. “I 
would rather be miserable with the Communists than to starve with the Democrats” was a 
sentiment expressed by a pensioner on one of Chisinau’s city streets in the summer of 
2001.
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V. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS SINCE FEBRUARY 2001:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
At the time of this writing, December 2001, the Communist government has been 
in power less than one year.  While it is impossible to predict how the government will 
act in detail, two general trends have appeared since February 2001.  On the domestic 
level, the Communist-dominated government appears in certain circumstances to have 
acted as some experts predicted that it would – as a “hard-line” government with 
authoritarian tendencies implementing its policies to gather more power for itself.  
However, on the international level, pressure from international organizations, 
particularly International Financial Institutions (IFIs), forced the government to act in 
ways contrary to previous rhetoric and to its campaign promises.   
A. DOMESTIC LEVEL 
1. Civil Liberties 
The U.S. Department of State, in its 1997-1998 country report on Moldova, states 
that Moldovan Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, but noted 
that there were problems in the areas of religious and media freedom.  
a. Free Press    
Moldovan expert and scholar, Charles King reported in the 2001 Freedom 
House Report that Moldova possesses a generally vibrant and free media. Indeed, 
Moldova has a variety of private newspapers, television and radio stations, but the state 
still owns and controls Teleradio-Moldova, a major mass media outlet.  According to 
Moldovan political analyst Igor Botan, the state has a history of using state-owned mass 
media to promote political events, dispense propaganda and ideology from the governing 
party’s viewpoint, and in limiting opposition party access to state-owned media.  This has 
caused friction between private media outlets that advocate transforming state-owned 
media outlets into public institutions and the government. 
The CP-dominated government did not initiate the reinstatement of the old 
Soviet practice of using state-owned media to promote its own programs.  This practice 
was actually implemented by the previous government in an attempt to limit opposition, 
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especially the CP, access to mass media (Botan).  These efforts have backfired because a 
former opposition party (the CP) is now the governing party and it is using the same 
tactics in its own favor.
However, the Moldovan Committee for the Freedom of the Press (CFP) 
warns of an alarming new trend by the new authorities to limit the freedom of expression 
and media liberties (“Voronin Says”). The CFP reported that “the undemocratic trend of 
Moldovan authorities is noticed in the intention of the power to return to the old practice 
of indicating [to] the press what and how [information] should be published…” 
(“Voronin Says”).  The practice of dictating what information is published seems highly 
likely since Voronin reportedly said that the new government would “take measures to 
control the media if its viewpoint was different from the communists” (“Voronin Says”).  
The fact that members of the government’s regulatory body, the Audio-Visual Council, 
will now be political appointees subordinate to the governing party, instead of an 
independent institution as it was before the 2001 parliamentary elections, makes this 
practice even more likely.  The CFP also reported instances of government denial of 
media access to information and the closure of publications that criticize the new 
government.   
b. State Regulation of Religion 
The 1994 constitution, which has received positive assessments from 
Western experts, provides the legal framework to ensure protection of minority rights and 
generally permits the free practice of religion (“Country Report”). However, a 1992 law 
that codifies religious freedoms contains restrictions that could hinder some religious 
activities. A continuing problem is the government’s refusal to register the Bessarabian 
Metropolitan Church, which has prevented the church from acquiring property legally. 
The Bessarabian Metropolitan Church is Eastern Orthodox and loyal to the Romanian 
patriarch rather than the Russian one. The church is a rallying point for pro-Romanian 
support in Moldova (King, “Nations” 278). The Bessarabian Metropolitan Church has 
one million members and administrates 18-20% of Moldovan Churches (“Government”).  
Over ninety-seven percent of the population is Eastern Orthodox  (“Mold.” GIS). The 
government has avoided recognizing the church in fear that official recognition might 
weaken Moldova’s independence (King, “Nations” 278).   
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On June 3, 1998, when the Supreme Court of Justice rejected a request to 
legalize the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church, the church took its case to the ECHR 
(European Court of Human Rights) (“Government”). On January 26, 1999, the case was 
registered and on June 6, 2001, formal proceedings commenced. On December 16, 2001, 
the ECHR announced the results of the hearing held on October 2, 2001.  The Court 
unanimously ruled that violations of Article 9 (freedom of religion) and Article 13 (right 
to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights had occurred and 
awarded the applicants EUR 27,025 in damages (“ECHR”).  The Court noted that 
because the Moldovan government had not recognized the church, that in effect, it could 
not operate (“EHCR”). An international lawyer, when asked his opinion on the Court 
ruling, stated that the “Court could not impose sanctions on Moldova” because political 
organizations were the only bodies eligible to do so (“ECHR”).  The article further 
quoted a reliable source as saying  “even if the ECHR judgment becomes effective in its 
present version, the church concerned would hardly be registered” (“ECHR”).
Another branch of the church, a branch loyal to the Moscow patriarch, has 
operated legally since 1991.  A September 27, 2001 news article reported that the 
government upgraded the status of the Metropolitan Church of Chisinau and All Moldova 
and named it “legal successor of the Bishopric of Chisinau and Hotin and Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia (“Government”).  The government claimed that state-recognition 
would “remove confusion in connection with the legal succession” (“Government”).  
State support of one religious organization over another for political 
reasons violates the basic democratic belief in separation of church and state. The legal 
recognition by the Moldovan government of one church and its refusal to recognize 
another indicates state interference in religious matters.  In this case, it appears, the 
interference was intended to ensure the government’s own political security.  It is too 
early to determine whether the current Moldovan government will abide by the Court 
ruling and register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia or whether it will appeal or 
even ignore the ruling.
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2. State Apparatus 
a. Executive-legislative relations 
In a presidential republic, government branches – the executive, the 
legislative, and the judiciary – must be separate and equal, providing a system of checks 
and balances.  Tension between branches is natural and healthy and is a characteristic that 
makes checks and balances work.  However, in a parliamentary system the governing 
party or coalition selects the prime minister and in Moldova’s case the president as well.  
The 1994 Moldovan Constitution bestows unilateral power on the Parliament to approve 
constitutional amendments with a two-thirds majority, essentially allowing one branch – 
the legislature – to control the Constitution. The Parliament’s July 2000 Constitutional 
Amendments effectively eliminated any presidential check on parliamentary power by 
limiting the powers of the president and by changing the constitution to allow the 
parliament to select and to dismiss the president.  These amendments place the prime 
minister, the president and the government under parliamentary control.  
b. Territorial Administrative Reform 
Perhaps the most important change the CP dominated government has 
proposed is one that deals with territorial administrative reform.  One CP campaign 
promise was to review the law governing the territorial administrative divisions and to 
transform them back to the former Soviet-style raions (“Electoral – CP”). In effect, the 
return to the old Soviet-style raions will allow a “Prefect,” appointed by the territorial 
governor to control the budgetary purse-strings of the district instead of control by locally 
elected officials (Botan).  Currently, each individual district, through an elected “local 
council,” determines how and on what activities it will spend monies designated from the 
state budget.
Critics of the proposed legislation fear a “strengthening of vertical 
political power” and see this change as moving back to a party-controlled country 
reminiscent of Soviet times – in other words, they see this legislation as a typically hard-
line Communist scheme to gain power (Botan). They fear that once the law is passed, the 
CP will attempt to gain complete control of the local councils in the next district 
elections, and in effect, completely control the districts.   If the CP follows through with 
their promise to return to Soviet-style raions and then is able to gain control of the local 
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councils in the next district elections, complete political and budgetary control of the 
districts and essentially the entire country will be in CP hands.  Mayors, minorities such 
as Gaugazians, and several non-Communist political parties greatly oppose this 
legislation. Despite widespread opposition among citizens, news articles strongly indicate 
that the CP will proceed with this legislation.  
3. International Financial Institutions 
On the international level, pressure from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
forces the government to act in ways contrary to previous rhetoric and campaign 
promises.  During the electoral campaign, the CP stated that the IMF was “too 
imperialist” (Botan).  Nevertheless, the CP began cooperating with the IMF soon after it 
came into power. 
The Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Policy of the Moldovan 
Government and the National Bank of Moldova, which Moldova signed with the IMF, 
required that several Moldovan wineries be offered as an investment tender by May 2001. 
The CP leaders had long opposed the privatization of state-owned wine and tobacco 
industries (King, “Nations” 281).  In November 1999, the Parliament had delayed the 
privatization of potentially lucrative wine and tobacco firms a reform required by the 
IMF.  This move prompted the IMF to suspend its program.  Four months later, on March 
20, 2000, an online news article reported,  “[t]he Communist faction will not support the 
projects on the privatization of the winemaking and tobacco enterprises” under any 
circumstances (“Comm. Against”).  
CP rhetoric reversed soon after the election.  Vladimir Voronin, then the CP 
leader, indicated that the Republic of Moldova would continue “fulfilling all its former 
obligations vis-à-vis all the foreign financial organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund” and would cooperate with them in the future (“Meeting”).  During the 
week of November 5-9, 2001, just nine months after the 2001 elections, the Parliament 
passed legislation intended to clear the way for resumed cooperation with the IMF.  
ADEPT (The Association for Participatory Democracy located in Chisinau) reported that 
during the week of November 5-9, 2001 “numerous public officials declared that the 
Republic of Moldova had respected all the conditions stipulated in the Memorandum 
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signed with IMF and there was no obstacle in resuming the external crediting of our 
country” (“Parlia. 5-9 Nov.”).  Afterwards, the IMF released the following statement. 
Prime Minister Vasily Tarlev has stated Moldova had met all 
commitments stipulated in the supplements to the Memorandum signed 
with the International Monetary Fund. This means the republic has closely 
approached to a moment when the IMF, and then the World Bank, 
European Union, and donor countries may resume lending. To the 
lawmakers' credit, they have managed to meet the deadline, November 15, 
to adopt a whole number of important laws - on insolvency, on free 
economic zones, and on financial establishments. Besides them, the 
Parliament passed in the first reading a law on money laundering, whose 
importance was also emphasized by the IMF. The bill on the 2002 State 
Budget - which has already been passed in two readings and which foreign 
experts complimented as one drafted by the Government with a high 
social responsibility - is also opening a door for Moldova to receive new 
external credits. (Tanas).
Although it appears from ADEPT’s political commentary that this legislation may 
not satisfy all the IMF requirements, the government, rather than refusing to work with 
the “imperialist” international organizations, is moving in that direction out of fiscal 
necessity.
Analysis of the recent actions of Moldova’s Communist government, especially 
with regard to media freedom and the administrative territorial reform, indicates that on 
the domestic level, where outside interference from international organizations is 
unlikely, the government has acted as expected – as an old-style hard-line government.  
In cases where international pressure, such as that from the IMF, is likely, recent 
government actions indicate that it will act as most governments in need of financial aid 
act – that is, it will adjust its policy out of sheer necessity.
4.  Moldova’s Dilemma:  Relations With Russia Or The West 
a. Relations with Russia 
Moldova finds itself in a difficult position in regards to its relations with 
Moscow and with the West.  The Republic of Moldova depends on economic and 
financial support from Russia and from International Financial Institutions and is equally 
indebted to both (“CDPD”).  Several factors push Moldova towards a tighter alignment 
with Russia and even the possibility of joining the Russia-Belarus union.  Russia, 
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Moldova’s biggest trading partner, receives 41% of Moldova’s exports and provides 21% 
of Moldova’s imports (“World Factbook”). Joining the Russia-Belarus Union, is 
attractive simply because customs and economic barriers that exist among the three 
countries would immediately be lifted (“CDPD”).  Moldova has been a member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, which is comprised of 12 former Soviet states, 
including Russia and Belarus, since December, 1991, providing a recent historical link to 
Russia (“Common.”). Thirteen percent of Moldova’s citizens are of ethnic Russian 
descent causing pressure from within, as well as external pressure resulting from cross-
border “homeland” nationalism (Brubaker, 53). And finally, the CP sees joining the 
Russia-Belarus Union as much easier for Moldova – they merely have to ask, whereas the 
initiative for European integration is made much more difficult because of the high 
standards that the EU will impose (“CDPD”).
The possibility of settling the Transnistrian conflict increases the 
attractiveness for joining the Russia-Belarus Union.  In April 2001, President Voronin 
met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the possible union with Russia and 
Belarus.  The talks, according to the two leaders, focused on economic cooperation and 
the continuing conflict in the breakaway province on Transnistria (“Mold. Seeks”).  Putin 
indicated that Russia would be willing to play a positive role in helping settle the conflict 
(“Mold. Seeks”).  Dialogue on the possible union continued throughout 2001, but as of 
this writing the union has not been finalized. 
However, on November 19, 2001, Putin and Voronin did sign a bilateral 
agreement titled the “Moldo-Russian Basic Political Treaty of Friendship.”  The 
preamble to the document discusses Russia’s adherence to the political settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict and designates Russia as the “guarantor” in the settlement process 
(“Presidents”).  Voronin stated, after the signing of the document, that the primary point 
was that “Russia stands up synonymously and unconditionally for the territorial integrity 
of Moldova” indicating his belief that Russia will not continue to back the separatist 
government in Transnistria (“Presidents”).  As with treaties in many countries, the 
signature of the president does not guarantee that the treaty will be ratified by the 
participant’s legislature.  The State Duma (lower chamber of the Russian Parliament) has 
indicated that it will not ratify the treaty for fear that the treaty will negate the 
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independence and territorial integrity of Transnistria by declaring it a part of Moldova 
(“Duma”).  Unless the Duma changes its stance on the Transnistria situation, ratification 
of the Treaty is unlikely and may be a barrier to Moldova’s possible union with Russia 
and Belarus. 
b. Relations with Europe and the West 
Moldovan elites apparently see no conflict in pursuing closer ties with 
Russia while at the same time pursuing European integration (Ungureanu, 31).  The 
Moldovan government has demonstrated that it is seeking closer ties with Russia while at 
the same time integration into the European Union is also a priority according to CP 
government officials.  However, CP support for EU entry is a fairly recent phenomenon.  
In May 2000, the Moldovan media reported that Vladimir Voronin, then the CP leader, 
said that EU integration was a “delirious idea” and that the CP would not support “this 
crazy undertaking” (“Com. Par. Lead.”).  The following month, the CP faction rejected 
an initiative introduced by the Party of Democratic Forces declaring Moldova’s intent to 
join the EU on the grounds that the initiative was “untimely” and noted that “Moldova 
should become an economically strong state” before being admitted into the EU and that 
its first priority should be dealing with the poverty of its people (“More Haste”).  
Just one year later, and only months after becoming the controlling party 
in the Parliament, Victor Stepaniuc, then CP leader, made a press statement declaring that 
integration into the EU structures was a foreign policy priority for Moldova (“Comm. 
Unwill.”).  On the same day as Stepaniuc voiced CP support of EU integration, the 
Parliament rejected a draft law to create a new ministerial structure – the Ministry of 
European Integration – a move that appeared to be a rejection of EU integration. CP 
Deputy Maria Postoico cited a lack of funds to support a new ministerial structure and 
duplication of functions with the Ministry of Exterior as reasons for the rejection 
(“Comm. Unwill.”). According to its non-CP drafters, this ministry is needed to 
coordinate Moldova’s preparations to enter the EU in the future. Communist Party 
opposition was quick to accuse the CP of non-support of EU integration for ideological 
reasons and of efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow.
These accusations seem to be unfounded in the light that Moldova does in 
fact have severe budget problems, cannot afford the duplication of functions between 
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government agencies and previous legislation during the Braghis government made 
allowances for the creation of a department of European Integration within the Ministry 
of Exterior structure to handle this coordination.  Furthermore, later that month, the 
Economics Ministry began a campaign to promote the idea of European integration.  It 
sponsored a meeting of business leaders, local politicians, government officials, media 
officials and diplomats based in Chisinau titled “Moldova’s Accession to the E.U. 
Additional Information Process.”  The meeting was designed to gain support for EU 
integration and to familiarize the public with the integration process (“Econ. Min.”).   
Further proof of Moldova’s intent to pursue European integration occurred 
on joining (on June 28, 2001) the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. At the EU's 
initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted on June 10, 1999, in 
Cologne. More than 40 partner countries and organizations accepted the challenge to help 
support the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, 
democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability
in the whole region" (“About”). Additionally, Euro-Atlantic integration was promised to 
all the countries in the region (“About”). This political initiative was designed to co-
ordinate and possibly accelerate the projects of all its partners, such as the European 
Commission, NATO and OSCE, the International Financial Institutions, the member 
states of the European Union, other Stability Pact partners such as the United States, 
Russia, Hungary, Canada, Norway and Switzerland along with all the countries of South 
Eastern Europe (“Press Handout”).  It was also designed to encourage and strengthen co-
operation between countries and to coordinate efforts to assist with political, economic 
and security integration (“Press Handout”). Three key sectors of the Pact include: the 
creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and 
the promotion of economic and social well-being (“About”).  The regional members 
include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR 
Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and 
Moldova (“About”).  Moldovan authorities look to the Pact to help them overcome many 
of the obstacles they face in attempting to prepare Moldova for full integration into the 
EU (“Ungureanu”). 
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Although admission to the Pact is a positive step towards European 
integration, barriers to EU membership exist. Oleg Ungureanu, in his article ”The 
Stability Pact For Southeastern Europe – A Means of Integrating the Republic of 
Moldova into Europe,” cites several obstacles to EU membership.  First, there is not any 
defined pro-European stance in Chisinau or among the general population. Second, there 
is an absence of strategy or even a lack of interest in Brussels regarding possible EU 
relations with Moldova.  The EU sees Moldova merely as a former Soviet republic and 
CIS member. However, the main obstacles, according to Ungureanu, are geopolitical in 
nature. Moldova is seen as belonging to “Russia’s area of influence” as evidenced by the 
continued presence of Russia troops in Transnistria, Moldova’s excessive dependence on 
Russia for energy sources, and its CIS membership.  The EU also sees the Transnistria 
conflict itself as a problem that must be resolved before Moldova is considered for 
membership especially since the Transnistria conflict involves Russia.  Russia has also 
taken the stance that trade relations and regulations between the EU and CIS member 
countries will hinder the economic integration among CIS members.  Russia’s stance, in 
turn, will hinder EU membership for CIS countries. (Ungureanu, 31-33) 
To summarize, many Moldovans think a union with Russia and Belarus 
will be a positive step for Moldova mainly for economic reasons. However, there are 
some negative aspects to consider.  A union with Russia and Belarus means joining with 
countries that have major economic and social problems of their own.  It will do nothing 
to lessen Moldova’s dependence on Russia for energy sources or to lessen the effects of 
Russia’s economy on Moldova’s.  These economic ties have already had severe 
consequences for Moldova’s economy as evidenced by the economic disaster suffered by 
Moldova during the downturn of Russia’s economy in 1998.  Furthermore, joining the 
Russia-Belarus union could jeopardize aid from the West because of the increased ties to 
Russia and future prospects for joining the EU might be severely handicapped because 
Moldova will belong to “Russia’s area of influence” (Ungureanu, 32).  In addition, 
joining the Russia-Belarus Union could escalate social and interethnic tensions. 
(Barbarosie, “Understanding”). The political cartoon (see Figure 5) appearing on the 
ADEPT website illustrates Moldova’s dilemma of hanging precariously between Russia 
and the West. European integration and ultimately joining the EU would be more 
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advantageous to Moldova in the long term, but as Charles King notes in his Freedom 
House Report “Nations In Transit 2001 – Moldova,” EU membership for Moldova is 
decades away (274).  First, Moldovan elites must realize that at the current time, seeking 
closer ties with Russia is incompatible with seeking EU membership and that it will be 
detrimental to their European integration aspirations unless major changes occur 
regarding Russia’s relations with the West.7  Next, the government must decide whether 
the short-term advantages gained by joining the Russia-Belarus Union are worth 
jeopardizing Moldova’s future EU membership even though it may be decades away.  
Only time will tell whether Moldova will gravitate towards Russia or towards Europe.  
Figure 5.   “Moldova’s Dilemma” – A. Dimitrov 
7 This may prove to be a moot point in light of the changes in geopolitics occurring between Russia 
and the West since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York City on September 11, 
2001. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Moldovans elected a Communist-dominated government in 2001 primarily 
because they were dissatisfied with their economic situation and believed that the 
Communist Party provided the best solution to that situation.  The other factors that 
contributed to the Communist Party’s victory were the impact of the electoral rules, the 
Communist campaign appeals, and citizen disillusionment with democratic reforms. It 
was only by the combination of all these factors that the Communist Party achieved its 
overwhelming victory. 
The implications of the Communist-dominated government on the key arenas 
necessary for democratic consolidation vary; however, two general trends have emerged 
since February 2001.  The first trend pertains primarily on the domestic level. The 
Communist-dominated government’s actions are reminiscent of the old Soviet party-state 
style of governance, especially on issues where no outside interference is expected.  For 
example, the Moldovan government has demonstrated increasing tendencies to control 
the media and to discriminate against religious organizations for its own gain.  In the 
former Soviet Union, governmental control of the media and strict regulation of religious 
organizations was widely practiced.  In another example, and possibly the most telling, it 
seems that the Moldovan Communist Party is attempting to gain complete control over 
all levels of government through its administrative and territorial reform legislation. 
Similarly, in the former Soviet Union, the party-state controlled every level of 
government. However, because the Soviet Union no longer exists as a party-state backed 
by the Soviet Army, the Moldovan Communist Party’s potential control is limited. 
Secondly, on the international level, pressure from international organizations, 
particularly international financial institutions, forces the government to act in ways 
contrary to previous rhetoric and to its campaign promises because it wishes to continue 
to receive financial and technical aid from the West.  For this reason, “a return the past” 
is not only unlikely, but is impossible. Without financial support from the former Soviet 
structure, Moldova must look to the West.  The Communist-dominated government may 
succeed in their goal to gather power but the world has changed and the former Soviet 
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states have changed along with it making it difficult for the Communist Party to behave 
in any way it pleases.  Globalization and international engagement programs have opened 
doors for the Western world to come into Moldova and other post-Soviet states. 
Seeking closer ties with Russia may have been more of a problem for Moldova 
before the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 
2001. However, since September 11, 2001, Russia and the West have been drawing 
closer making even a union with Belarus and Russia seem as much less alarming to the 
West than before.   Previously, Moldova’s attempts to seek closer ties with Russia while 
at the same time making preparations for European integration sent confusing signals to 
Western governments and to international financial institutions.  There is still the 
possibility that if Moldova continues its quest to join the Russia-Belarus Union, it may 
jeopardize its chance for European integration and EU membership, but not for the same 
reasons as before.  And since EU membership for Moldova is not in the immediate 
future, joining the Russia-Belarus Union could have nearer-term positive implications for 
the economically struggling state. 
With the “War on Terrorism” in full swing, regional stability is more important 
than ever.  The U.S. has a stake in assisting newly democratizing countries worldwide. 
No longer just a military-to-military program, the State Partnership Program provides 
opportunities for interaction in military, social, and economic spheres.  Interaction 
between partner states gives physical expression to the institutions and policies that the 
U.S. believes are needed to build better democracies.   
In answering the question, what can the U.S., and in particular, the N.C. State 
Partnership Program do to further assist Moldova’s successful transition to a modern 
democratic nation-state, one major factor seems evident. Moldova’s Communist 
government has demonstrated that international influence can cause it to adjust its 
policies and even implement reforms especially to gain or maintain financial assistance.  
Because the State Partnership Program is primarily an engagement tool, it does not offer 
monetary assistance to partner countries.  However, other incentives, such as assisting the 
state-to-state exchange between in civil-military relations, industry, agriculture and 
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business, can be utilized to encourage Moldova’s government to continue its democratic 
reforms.   
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APPENDIX.  HISTORICAL TIMELINE8
1526 Bessarabia (Moldova) part of the Ottoman Empire. 
1787 Girai Khanate established by Ottoman Empire for the 
former Khans of the Crimea. 
1791 Eastern Moldavia annexed by Russia.  
28 May 1812 Bessarabia annexed by Russia.  
15 Dec 1917 Moldavian Democratic Republic proclaimed by the 
Council of State (Sfatul Teriy).
24 Dec 1917 Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Southern 
Region founded by Bolsheviks (Communists) in 
opposition. 
14 Jan 1918 Front Committee of "Rumcherod" [Central Executive 
Committee of Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Deputies Romanian Front, Black-sea Navy and 
Odessa. Odessa Region] proclaimed itself the supreme 
power in Bessarabia. 
18 Jan 1918 - Feb 1918 Ukrainian (Ukrainian People's Republic) intervention.    
19 Jan 1918 - Mar 1918 Romanian occupation.  
6 Feb 1918 Council of State proclaimed independence from Russia. 
(Moldavan Democratic Republic)  
9 Apr 1918 Council of State accepted a Romanian protectorate.  
10 Dec 1918 Incorporation into Romania completed.  
11 Oct 1924 Moldavian A.S.S.R. established in the Ukrainian S.S.R. 
by Soviet Union.
28 Jun 1940 Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union (from 2 
Aug 1940 Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic).
25 Jul 1941 - 22 Aug 1944 Reincorporation into Romania.  
15 Sep 1947 Reincorporation into the Soviet Union (de facto 1944).
8 Ben M. Cahoon. 
58
23 Jun 1990 Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova
23 May 1991 Republic of Moldova  
27 Aug 1991 Moldovan independence declared.  
1 Dec 1991 Dneister [Transnistria] declares independence from 
Moldova (not recognized). 
25 Dec 1991 Independence effective (dissolution of U.S.S.R.).
7 Mar 1994 Referendum rejects union with Romania.
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